The current Russian nationality crisis in the USSR might be considered certainly with some interest and perhaps even with some profit from the perspective of the crisis that led to wholesale Westernization in seventeenth-century Muscovy.
"genuinely Russian" or in ancient Byzantium, the destruction and collapse of Old Russian high culture (painting, music, architecture, literature) , and their replacement by a flood of "Western" (often, but not always, Polish) architecture, poetry, drama, styles of dress, music, military technology and tactics, and so forth. Nativists protested, the foreigners were segregated/ghettoized in the North Europeans' settlement, and Peter the Great was the result.
The recent Soviet experience has many parallels to that of pre-Petrine Muscovy centuries ago. The Soviet military, led by the Brezhnev build-up to believe it was the most powerful in the world, was humiliated in Afghanistan. The Central Asian population explosion is a demographic disaster exactly the opposite of that of the famine of 1601-03 and the plague of 1654, but with almost equally unsettling consequences. Socialist realism has proved to be totally bankrupt and debilitating in literature, music, and painting. Most demoralizing has been the performance of the economy, the realm in which the Bolshevik materialists were most certain of all that they were masterful. By the end of the 1970s the Soviet authorities had tried "everything" (higher prices, incentives, consumers' goods, enhanced geographical mobility for the peasants, expanded private plots, limited ownership, education�ne at a time) to make agriculture work. This was reported at an Agricultural Economics Workshop at the University of Chicago, where the late Arcadius Kahan sagely asked the dumbfounded Soviet presenter whether any thought had ever been given to trying all of them at once-which would have meant repealing centralized, collectivized Soviet agriculture. By 1985, according to Solidarity adviser Andrzej Richard, the Poles had "tried everything" in an attempt to make socialism work and concluded that it could not be made to work.
Between September 22 and October 5, 1987, the Bulgarians held a closed "theory seminar" in which they and their Soviet guests concluded essentially the same thing-that socialism could not possibly be made to work. Gorbachev's advisers were there, and he must have known at least since that time that socialism was/is totally bankrupt and cannot be revived. The politician's essential goal, holding on to power, must have been the fact which led the Soviet ruler to reproach Bulgarian dictator Todor Zhivkov for picking advisers who thought of "making Bulgaria a mini-West Germany or mini-Japan" and to the public stance that socialism could be reformed. As a safety valve, however, he made himself head of state as well as head of the Party and has arrogated potentially totally dictatorial powers to himself.
The response to the collapse has been a questioning of national identity and goals. As I tried to show in Slavery in Russia 1450-1725, the Russians have always had trouble with their national identity. Just what is "a Russian" has been a major question for millennium. Russian "blood" means nothing, inter alia, because, for example, the many of the last princes of Kievan Rus' were seven-eighths Turkic, Ivan the Terrible claimed he was a German or Swede, and the last Romanov was sixty-three-sixty-fourths German. Osteologically, Great Russians are supposedly 95 percent Czech and 5 percent
